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NOTES AND COMMENTS

LEGISLATIVE ETHICS
The concept of public office as a "public
trust" was given legal effect under common
law. With his status as trustee of the people, the official had the duty of acting on
behalf of the public, regardless of his own
interests, and the principles of the laws of
agency and trust were applied to him in
this capacity.' Consequently, any gift,
gratuity or benefit taken in violation of his
duty, or any interest adverse to his principal, acquired without a full disclosure,
was a betrayal of his trust and he was required to account to his principal for all
2
he had received.
Activities such as direct theft or embezzlement from the government, or the
taking of a bribe, have long been punishable under common law and under statute.
But the recent furor over morality of public officials, and, more particularly, the
ethics of our legislators, has centered
around the so-called "gray areas." For example, a legislator generally is not prohibited by statute from including his
relatives on the public payroll, or accepting
campaign contributions and gifts from
1

United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306

(1910).
2

Ibid.

lobbyists and pressure groups. Yet, such
behavior is being looked upon with increasing public disfavor. A legislator practicing as an attorney before a state agency
or court of claims may arouse suspicion
that undue influence is being exerted. In
addition, when the legislator who is also a
businessman, or banker, or farmer, introduces or votes on a bill dealing with business, banking, or agriculture, the question
may arise as to whether he is acting in his
own interest or in -that of his constituents.
Yet, since almost every phase of American
life is touched in some way by legislation,
it is inevitable that legislators will often
have a personal interest in the bills that
come before them, even if the interest is
only one of a general nature, e.g., taxes or
automobile licensing.
Currently, there exists a trend favoring
the enactment or the strengthening of legislative ethics laws. The difficulty of enacting
effective legislation in this area, however,
may be seen from a sampling of the factors
that must be considered by the draftsmen
of such bills. Most state legislatures have
short sessions, with proportionate compensation, thereby requiring many members to
retain their usual employment during their
terms of office. Although membership in
the United States Senate or House of Rep-

11
resentatives is more adequately compensated and, often, more in the nature of a
career than service in state bodies, it has
been found in a recent study 3 that most
of our federal legislators also engage in
outside activities for compensation. In this
respect, the legislative differs from the
executive branch, in which most of the
members are career officials. Thus, the regulation of the conduct of legislators might
not be equitable if the same standards were
applied to them as to administrators. In
the enactment of ethics laws, consideration
must also be given to American political
usage, with its tradition of campaign con4
tributions, patronage and compromise.
The draftsmen must keep in mind the
fact that an essential concept in ethics legislation is that the evil sought to be avoided
is not only the actual abuse of position, but
also any appearance of abuse, which tends
to undermine public regard for those in
office.' However, objections may be raised
opposing the imposition of criminal sanctions for creating the mere appearance of
wrongdoing.6 Since potential conflicts of
interest are so varied, the statute must be
broad enough to include the practices
sought to be eliminated while not prohibiting necessary and legitimate areas of
conflict. 7 The purpose and scope of this
3 N.Y. Herald Tribune, June 9, 1965, p. 28, cols.
7-8.
4 Eisenberg, Conflicts of Interest Situations and
Remedies, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 666, 667-68
(1959).
5 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.87 (Supp. 1964).
6 See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3865-66 (1962), in which Senator Keating objected to criminal sanctions for any of the
activities that fall within what he terms "this
shadowland of conduct."
7 The existence of necessary and legitimate areas
of conflict was recognized by a recent New York
Committee on Ethics when it considered and re-
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note will be to outline and compare the
various statutes, both federal and state,
that have undertaken to regulate the ethics

of legislators, with particular emphasis on
the controversial New York law.

FederalStatutes
From its very inception, the federal government recognized the possibility of conflict between the public duty and the
private interests of its officials. At its first

session, in 1789, Congress made it unlawful for certain treasury department
officials to engage in trade or commerce,

own a sea vessel, purchase public property
or be involved in the purchase or disposal
of public securities. Subsequent laws were
passed to regulate various activities of
other federal employees. 9 Not until 1863,

however,

did

Congress

attempt

self-

regulation. In that year, it enacted a law

prohibiting its members from practicing
in the United States Court of Claims. 1°
Since that time, Congress has statutorily

prohibited its members from accepting
bribes, making or holding contracts with
the federal government, and rendering
services for compensation before a federal

department or agency.
Under current provisions of the United
States Code, it is unlawful to bribe, or

attempt to bribe, a Congressman or Congressman-elect, with the intent either: (1)
to influence any official act; (2) to influ-

ence the legislator to commit any fraud on

jected a rule prohibiting voting on bills in case

of conflict of interest. 1964 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No.
42, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
ETHICS.
8 Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372 (1882).
9 Id. at 372-73.
10 REV. STAT. § 1058 (1863), 18 U.S.C. § 204
(Supp. IV, 1963).
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the United States; or (3) to induce him
to violate his lawful duty."' It is likewise
unlawful for a member of Congress, or
member-elect of Congress, to solicit, receive, or agree to receive, whether directly
or indirectly, anything of value, for himself or another, in return for any of the
2
three above-mentioned acts.1
A present, former or elected member of
Congress who, "otherwise than as provided
by law for the proper discharge of official
duty, directly or indirectly asks, demands,
exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or
agrees to receive anything of value for
himself for or because of any official act
performed or to be performed by him,"' 13
as well as a person who gives, offers or
promises the same to him, 14 shall be fined
15
or imprisoned, or both.
A present or elected member of Congress may not seek or receive any compensation for any service rendered or to be
rendered, either by himself or by another,
in relation to any proceeding or determination, before any federal department or
agency, in which the United States is a
party or has "a direct and substantial in-

"l 18
12

U.S.C. § 201(b) (Supp. IV, 1963).
18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (Supp. IV, 1963). Con-

viction of any of these crimes carries a maximum penalty of $20,000 or three times the
monetary equivalent of the thing of value, which-

ever is greater, or imprisonment for a maximum
of 15 years, or both, and possible disqualification from holding any office of honor, trust or
profit under the United States.
13 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (Supp. IV, 1963).
14 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) (Supp. IV, 1963).

15 18 U.S.C. § 201(i)

(Supp. IV, 1963). The

maximum fine is $10,000, and the maximum
term of imprisonment is two years.

interest."' 6 A criminal sanction is imposed
upon violators of the ban on practice in
the Court of Claims. 1'7 A member of Congress may not execute or hold any contract with the United States or any of its
agencies. Contracts made in violation of
this provision are void, the money advanced to the legislator must be returned,
and a maximum fine of three thousand
dollars is imposed. 8 This statute covers
any contract or agreement, "no matter how
fairly obtained or held, how reasonable in
its terms, or how advantageous to the
United States."' 9
This is the total extent of federal statutory regulation of legislative ethics. Conspicuously absent is any reference to the
"gray area" problems, which currently are
of greater concern than the traditional
bribery and government contract questions
of conflict.
State Statutes

The state legislatures generally have
been even less active than Congress in enacting measures concerning the ethics of
their own members. Apparently, certain
states have not even found the problem to
be of sufficient importance to warrant consideration.-0 Yet, some recent state legislation is comparable to, and even more in16 18 U.S.C. § 203(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). A violation of this law by a legislator, or by one who
knowingly gives, promises or offers such compensation is punishable by a fine of not more
than $10,000 or a 'prison sentence of not more
than two years, or both, and he is thereafter
ineligible to hold any office of honor, trust or
profit under the United States.
1718 U.S.C. § 204 (Supp. IV, 1963).
18 18 U.S.C. § 431 (1958).

19United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 671, 673

(C.C.D. Neb. 1904).
2"See Note, 76 HARV. L.
(1963).

REV.

1209, 1210-11
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clusive than, the federal sections.
Several states have statutes covering the
giving and receiving of bribes by legislators. 21 Another obvious area of conflict
has been covered by various states through
the enactment of laws forbidding contracts between a legislator and the state.
An Arizona statute, for example, provides
that members of the legislature shall not
be interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract made by the legislature.22 Kansas
prohibits any interest on the part of a legislator, within one year of the expiration of
his term, in a contract with the state which
is authorized by any law enacted during
his term.2 3 On the other hand, the wording
of the North Dakota statute does not restrict the ban to contracts made through
the state legislature. 24 Kentucky law has
separate provisions for contracts upon
which the legislator may be called to vote
and other contracts made with any
25
agency.
The format and coverage of the Massachusetts law26 resembles the federal
statute, even to the extent of its making
separate provisions for part-time government employees.
In contrast with statutes which impose
criminal sanctions, Minnesota has enacted
a code of legislative ethics which is to be
enforced by legislative committees. By its
terms, a legislator

22 See, e.g., TEXAS CONST. art. 16, § 41; MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.313 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 613.06 (1945).
22

ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-446(A) (1956).

KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-132 (1949).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-03-21 (1960).
25
KY. REV. STAT. § 61.096(2), (6) (Supp.
1962).
22

24

26

MAss. ANN. STAT. ch. 268A (1963).

should not accept other employment which
will impair his independence of judgment
in the exercise of his official duties ... [or
receive compensation] for activity before
any state board, commission or public
agency when such activity is in substantial
conflict between his personal interest and
his duties in the public interest so as to
thereby create a possibility of2 undue influence or wrongful advantage. 1
In addition, he should refrain from acting
and voting in any matter where the interest of the public and his own interest are
or may be in conflict.28 Permanent committees on ethics were created in both the
Minnesota Senate and House of Representatives 29 to render advisory opinions
upon request, to receive and consider complaints concerning alleged violations, and
to investigate and hold hearings.3° Should
the committee determine that a violation
has occurred, it recommends appropriate
disciplinary action to the Senate or House,
or it delivers its findings to the attorney
general for civil or criminal action if he
2
deems it warranted. 1
A survey of the body of law of other
states reveals only occasional provisions
governing "gray area" activities. For example, Nevada prohibits a legislator from
employing, in any capacity, on behalf of
the state or one of its subdivisions, any
relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity; 2 and Kentucky does not
permit a legislator to receive compensation
for any appearance before an agency as an
expert witness 2 3 But these provisions are
27MINN.

STAT.

ANN.

§

3.88(a),

(b)

(Supp.

1964).
28 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.88(c) (Supp. 1964).
29 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.89 (Supp. 1964).
30 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.90(1)
(Supp. 1964).
"1MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.90(5) (Supp. 1964).
32 NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.210(1) (1963).
.2 Ky. REV. STAT. § 61.096(3) (Supp. 1962).
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too specific to include the wide variety of
activities that can be brought within the
Minnesota code of ethics.
New York Statute
New York, considered the pioneer in
legislative ethics, and from whose law the
Minnesota code of ethics is derived, enacted both penal provisions and a nonpenal code of ethics in 1954. An executive
message to the legislature acknowledged
the obvious immorality of bribery and corruption, and sought definitions and guidelines in the less apparent areas of possible
conflict between private interest and public
service. 34 This message provided the
needed impetus for the enactment of a law
which made it a misdemeanor 35 for a member of the legislature to commit either of
the following acts:
(1) receive, for services to be rendered
in any case or matter before any state
agency, compensation which is to be contingent upon certain action by the state
3
agency ; 6
(2) sell any goods or services having a
value in excess of twenty-five dollars to
any state agency, unless pursuant to an
award or contract let after public notice
and competitive bidding. (Included under
the prohibition is a firm or association of
which the legislator is a member, or a
corporation in which he controls ten per
cent or more of the stock.3 7 )

In addition, there was enacted a code
of ethics which contained the following
provisions applicable to a legislator:
(1) he should not "have any interest,
financial or otherwise, direct or indirect,
or engage in any business or transaction or
professional activity or incur any obligation
of any nature, which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties
3
in the public interest"; 1
(2) he should not accept other employment which will impair his independence of
judgment as a legislator, or which will require him to disclose confidential information acquired as a legislator;
(3) he should not disclose this confidential information, nor use it for his
personal interests, nor attempt to use his
position to secure unwarranted privileges
or exemptions for himself or others;
(4) he should not give reasonable basis
for the impression that he can be improperly influenced;
(5) he should conduct himself so as not
to raise public suspicion that he is likely
to be committing acts violative of his
trust.39
As in Minnesota, the legislative code of
ethics is administered by committees in the
Senate and Assembly, set up to receive and
investigate complaints and report their
findings to the proper body.40 In addition,
the attorney general is authorized to establsh an advisory committee on ethical
standards for officers and employees of
state agencies, 4 the services of which

4 See 1954 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39, REPORT OF
THE

SPECIAL

LEGISLATIVE

COMMITTEE

ON

IN-

TEGRITY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT.
35 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(10), derived
from N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1878.
36 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(2).
37 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(4).

N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 74(2).
OFFICERS LAW § 74(3)(b),
(f), (h).
40 N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 87.
41 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 74.
38

39N.Y. PUB.

(c),

11
committee have been used by members of
the legislature, 42 although they are not included by the statute.
The final provision of the ethics legislation passed in 1954 contained a disclosure
section which provided that a record of
appearances made by attorneys for a fee
before certain state departments must be
4
kept open to public inspection. 3
The special legislative committee which
proposed these measures reported that it
had been urged to recommend the creation
of a commission of non-legislative members to enforce the code of ethics. 44 The
committee rejected this suggestion on the
ground that the Constitution of New York
State imposes upon each house the duties
of determining the rules of its own proceedings and the qualifications of its own
members. 45 It noted that the courts are reluctant to permit interference with this
responsibility by any executive, judicial, or
joint legislative agency, even if such an
agency be created by the legislature. 6
Despite this decision by the 1954 committee, a similar committee ten years later
recommended the establishment of a state
ethics commission to render advisory
opinions interpreting ethics laws and rules
47
for both legislators and state employees.
However, the bill introduced to effect the
See 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 9, REPORT AND
DIGEST OF PERTINENT STATUTES AND OPINIONS
42

SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE
AND

ETHICAL

STANDARDS

IN

ON INTEGRITY

GOVERNMENT

16.

45

N.Y.

46

1954 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39, REPORT OF THE
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(2) a legislator may not accept any gift
having a value of twenty-five dollars or
more, regardless of its form, if it could
be reasonably inferred that the gift was
intended to influence him; 4
(3) the firm of which the legislator is
a member may transact business with the
court of claims so long as he does not
share in the profits of such transaction.51
The 1965 law also transfers to the Public Officers Law the following provisions
that had been added in 1964 to the Legislative Law:
(1) the giving to, and receiving of bribes
by members of the legislature is a felony; 6
(2) the unauthorized receipt by a legislator of something of value for the performance or omission of some official act
57
is also felonious;

48

A. Int. 235, Pr. 6664 (1965).

49 1964 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 42, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ETHICS 4-5.
50 Id. at 4.
51 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(3).

AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT 16.
47 1964 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 42, REPORT OF THE

N.Y. Times, June 8, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
§ 73(7).
54 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(5).
55 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(9).
56 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW §§ 75, 76.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ETHICS 6-7.

57

CONST. art. III,

§ 9.

SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON

52

INTEGRITY

1965

creation of this commission48 was not
passed.
The other major recommendations of
the 1964 committee were the prohibition
of practice by legislators before the state
court of claims 4 9 and before state
agencies.- ° After much debate, the former
was adopted by the legislature 51 and the
latter was rejected.5 2 Among the additional
penal provisions enacted in 1965 are:
(1) a legislator may not, within two
years after the termination of his service,
receive compensation to promote or op5 3
pose the passage of bills by either house;

RELATING TO INTEGRITY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS

IN GOVERNMENT 11-13.
43 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 166.
44 1954 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39, REPORT OF THE

CATHOLIC

53 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW

N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 77.
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(3) disclosure must be made to the
clerk of the Assembly or the secretary of
the Senate of any financial interest held
by a legislator, his spouse, or minor
children in any activity which is subject
to the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency;
of every office and directorship held by
him in any corporation or firm so subject;
or of any other interest which he determines in his discretion might reasonably
be expected to be particularly affected by
legislative action, or that should be disclosed in the public interest; 58
(4) a legislator who knowingly and
wilfully makes a false statement in relation
to these provisions commits a misdemeanor;59
(5) copies of these disclosures are to
be open for public inspection; 60
(6) legislators must certify that they
know of, and will conform to, the ethics
legislation applicable to them.61
The activities encompassed by these sections are carefully specified so as to prevent circumvention by technicalities. It is
somewhat ironic that the legislators of the
one state which has enacted such a complete legislative ethics law should have
been subject to such severe criticism for
62
their allegedly lax attitude on ethics.

N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(6) (a).
N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(6)(c).
60 N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(6) (b).
6l N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 78.
62 See N.Y. Times, June 8, 1965, p.

58

59

1, col. 1;

Much of this criticism was triggered by the
rejection of the proposed ban on practice
before state agencies. Even assuming that
the defeat of that provision was a serious
setback to the effectiveness of the statute,
it must be remembered that New York is
still a leading state in ethics legislation.
Conclusion
A survey of existing statutes on legislative ethics indicates that, despite the
difficulties involved in drafting such a law,
it is possible to enact provisions which, if
properly enforced, will both eliminate corruption and reasonably regulate "gray
area" activities. New York has passed
such a law and, those states which are considering similar legislation will find the
New York statute, with its separate penal
and non-penal provisions, its sections on
disclosure, and its other specifically defined features, to be a useful guide. Of
course, the effectiveness of any legislative
ethics law will depend, to a great extent
upon the willingness to enforce it, whether
by prosecution or by appropriate disciplinary action within each house. Ideally,
however, the passage of statutes, which
specifically prescribe the standards with
which the legislators will be expected to
conform, will be sufficient to deter individuals from the proscribed activities so
as to preclude any necessity for such
prosecution or disciplinary action.
p. 27, col. 3; N.Y. Herald Tribune, June 9, 1965,
p. 26, col. 1.

